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WHAT IS THE PROBABILITY OF  
RECEIVING A U.S. PATENT? 
Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde, and Alan Marco 
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 203 (2015) 
ABSTRACT 
What proportion of patent applications filed at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) are eventually granted? Many experts have 
suggested that the USPTO approves nearly all applications, blaming 
this apparent leniency for many problems with the U.S. patent system. 
To test this assumption, we follow the prosecution histories of 2.15 
million U.S. patent applications from 1996 to mid-2013. We find that 
only 55.8% of the applications emerged as patents without using 
continuation procedures to create related applications. The allowance 
rate has decreased substantially over time, particularly for 
applications in the “Drugs and Medical Instruments” and “Computers 
and Communications” fields. Furthermore, applications filed by small 
firms were less likely to emerge as patents than those filed by large 
firms. We discuss the implications of our findings for inventors, 
policymakers, and legal scholars. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Inventors choose to protect their inventions with patents for a 
variety of reasons.1 A key element of inventors’ cost-benefit calculus 
regarding patents is the expectation that their applications will 
succeed. Unfortunately, there is little information about the historical 
rates at which the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) grants patents. This lack of information about the 
probability of obtaining a patent makes it difficult for inventors to 
determine the best way to protect their intellectual property. 
The absence of systematic evidence on patent allowance rates also 
skews policy discussions about the patent examination standards 
employed by the USPTO. Some scholars argue that the USPTO grants 
patents too easily, pointing to patents like the “Beerbrella” (U.S. 
Patent #6637447), swinging methods (U.S. Patent #6368227), and a 
user-operated amusement apparatus for kicking the user’s buttocks 
(U.S. Patent #6293974). These scholars argue that a large number of 
such frivolous, “rubber-stamped” patents are hindering, rather than 
promoting, the U.S. innovation system.2 For example, some entities, 
often referred to as “patent trolls,” allegedly obtain patents with 
dubious claims solely to extract rents from genuine inventors who may 
appear to be infringing on the entities’ patents. Judge Posner recently 
opined that “the problem of patent trolls is a function in part of the 
promiscuity with which the patent office has issued patents.”3  
Despite numerous allegations of USPTO laxity and calls for 
reforms based on anecdotal observations of silly patents, few studies 
have attempted to calculate the actual percentage of U.S. patent 
applications that succeed. The calculation of patent allowance rates, 
while seemingly simple, is complicated by several aspects of the patent 
examination process. First, patent applications that are initially 
rejected after examination can produce “new,” closely related 
applications called “continuations.” Continuations are difficult to 
track, but may ultimately emerge as patents. Second, the USPTO 
publishes examination outcomes only for granted applications, if filed 
before November 29, 2000, or for applications pending eighteen 
                                                             
1 See, e.g., Wesley Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper W7552, 2000). 
2 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 3 (2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & 
JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM 
IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 25-26 
(2004); STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 52-
55 (2004). 
3 Richard Posner, Patent Trolls—Posner, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (July 21, 2013, 
5:12PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/patent-trollsposner.html. 
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months after application date if filed on or after November 29, 2000.4 
Third, applicants alter the claims in their applications during the 
examination process. The allowance of some patentable claims within 
an application is not the same as the allowance of an application as it 
was filed, and this distinction should be taken into account in any 
discussion of allowance rates, particularly as it pertains to the extent 
of scrutiny associated with the examination process. 
In this study, we address the above challenges by analyzing 
unique application-level data available internally at the USPTO. The 
data tracks 2.15 million utility patent applications filed from 1996 to 
2005 and examined until June 30, 2013, by which time 99.8% of the 
progenitor applications had been granted or abandoned.5 “Progenitor 
applications” are applications unrelated to any previously filed U.S. 
patent applications. This allows us to link each progenitor application 
to related subsequent applications produced by various continuation 
procedures. We can thereby accurately estimate the probability of 
allowance without the limitations of previous studies based on partial 
samples of published applications or exit cohorts.6  
In order to capture the complexity of the examination process, we 
calculate three measures of patent allowance rates: (i) first-action 
allowance rate, the proportion of progenitor applications allowed 
without further examination; (ii) progenitor allowance rate (or simply, 
allowance rate), the proportion of progenitor applications allowed 
without any continuation procedure, and (iii) family allowance rate, 
the proportion of progenitor applications that produce at least one 
patent, including the outcomes of continuation applications that 
emerge from progenitor applications. 
                                                             
4  See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2012) (describing when applicants can request that 
applications not be published); Domestic Publication of Foreign Filed Patent 
Applications of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 § 4502, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999). 
5  Since the average patent application pends for four to five years at the USPTO 
before it is granted, a non-trivial fraction of applications filed after 2005 are still 
pending, making it impossible to calculate definitive allowance rates for 
applications filed in the latter years of our sample. 
6  Data on unpublished applications is not made available in order to protect 
applicants who may abandon their applications prior to the 18-month publication 
date. If unpublished applications are more likely to be abandoned, then allowance 
rates based on publicly available data (i.e., published applications) would be biased 
upwards. See  Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber 
Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 101, 106-07 (2009) (analyzing a small sample of 9,960 
published applications); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing 
Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office—
Extended, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 35, 36-37 (2002) [hereinafter Quillen & Webster, 
Continuing Patent Applications] (noting that data for applications filed before 1980 
is not available); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent 
Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent Office—One More Time, 18 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 379 (2009) [hereinafter Quillen & Webster, One More Time] (explaining 
the difficulties associated with linking original applications to their corresponding 
continuations).  
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I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data for our analysis are drawn from the USPTO’s internal 
databases, which provide the essential records for the public Patent 
Application and Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. These internal 
databases include information on the prosecution histories of every 
published patent application filed at the USPTO, including application 
filing dates, pending application status, and continuation applications. 
The USPTO publishes examination outcomes through its PAIR system 
for applications pending 18 months after application date, if filed on or 
after November 29, 2000, with exceptions made for applications that 
are filed with a non-publication request.7 The chief advantage of this 
internal data is that it permits us to observe the patent prosecution 
histories of applications filed at the USPTO before November 29, 
2000, as well as those of unpublished applications filed after this date. 
We refined our sample population of all patent applications filed at 
the USPTO after January 01, 1996 to retain only utility patent 
applications. 
We then tracked the allowances, abandonments, and continuations 
for all progenitor applications that entered patent examination for the 
first time during 1996-2005. For most applications, we did not observe 
the final examination outcome until four to five years after the filing 
date. Our choice of 2005 as the last cohort year limits the number of 
applications still pending as of June 30, 2013 in our study to 18,270 
(less than 1% of the 2.15 million applications), thereby minimizing 
censoring errors.   
We identified certain application characteristics based on the 
information contained in USPTO internal guidelines as well as other 
publicly available sources. First, we determined the application origin 
(U.S. or foreign) based on the address of the first named inventor on 
each application. We then determined if the application was filed by a 
“large” or “small” entity based on USPTO information about the fees 
paid by the applicants at the time of filing.8 Finally, we used the 
National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER) classification scheme 
to aggregate the more than five hundred USPTO technology classes 
into six broad technology fields (Chemical; Drugs and Medical; 
Electrical and Electronics; Computers and Communications; 
Mechanical; and a miscellaneous “Other”) for ease of discussion.9 
                                                             
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012). For an analysis of the percentage of inventors who file 
non-publication requests, see Stuart Graham & Deepak Hegde, Disclosing Patents’ 
Secrets, SCIENCE, Jan. 16, 2015, at 236-237. 
8 Small entities, defined as those with five hundred or fewer employees, qualify for a 
discount on patent application fees. 
9 See Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent 
Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper W8498, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf. 
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II. PATENT EXAMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Examination Process 
We simplify our description of the patent examination process to 
discuss only events relevant to our objective.10 Accordingly, Figure 1 
presents a stylized version of the patent examination process using 
data from the 1996-2005 filing cohorts of progenitor applications. Each 
application is queued for examination and then docketed to an 
examiner. Incomplete or unpaid applications are considered 
abandoned and are not docketed to an examiner. The first substantive 
examination of the application is called the “first action on the merits” 
(or simply “first action”). The first action includes a search report 
listing relevant prior art that supports the examiner’s decision of 
either allowance or non-final rejection. The USPTO allowed 11.4% of 
the progenitor applications at first action and delivered a non-final 
rejection decision for 86.4% of the applications, with the remaining 
2.3% abandoned prior to a first action decision. The Office allowed 
36.1% of the progenitor applications after one or more rounds of 
amendments and negotiations with the examiner, while 14.5% were 
abandoned between non-final and final rejection. The remaining 
38.7% of progenitor applications received a final rejection. 
 
[Figure 1 on next page] 
  
                                                             
10  The USPTO’s official utility patent application filing guide provides a more 
comprehensive description of the rules and procedures. See Nonprovisional 
(Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/types/utility.jsp (last updated Jan., 2014). 
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Figure 1: The U.S. Patent Examination Process 
 
Figure 1 shows a simplified representation of the U.S. patent 
examination process. It also shows the key intermediate and final 
outcomes, as of June 30, 2013, for the 2.15 million applications filed 
for the first time (“progenitor” applications) between 1996 and 2005. 
The percentage indicated at each transition state reflects the 
percentage of the total progenitor applications that reached the 
state. First-action allowance rate refers to the proportion of 
progenitor applications that were allowed without amendment; 
Progenitor allowance rate refers to the proportion of progenitor 
applications that were eventually allowed and patented without 
continuation processes; Family allowance rate refers to the 
proportion of progenitor applications that produced at least one 
patent, including the allowances of continuation applications that 
emerged from the progenitors. Abandonments and allowances may 
not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
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For most applications, therefore, patent prosecution ends with 
patent issue or with abandonment. Applications are considered 
abandoned if the applicant does not respond to the examiner’s decision 
by the stipulated deadlines or if the applicant expressly requests 
abandonment. Applicants can, however, continue to submit amended 
applications even after receiving a final rejection. Of applications that 
received a final rejection, 9.3% were subsequently allowed after 
further amendments. Applicants can also formally appeal a final 
rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 
Accordingly, 7.5% of final rejections were subject to appeals, 41.4% of 
which resulted in allowances. Overall, 55.8% of progenitor 
applications filed between 1996 and 2005 and examined before mid-
2013 emerged as patents without the use of continuation procedures.  
B. Continuation Procedures 
Applicants can continue prosecution after receiving a final 
rejection through various continuation procedures. Some scholars 
have blamed continuation procedures for abuses of the patent system 
such as submarine patents (patents that are intentionally delayed 
from publication and issue by the applicant for a long time), long 
pending patent applications, and low-quality patents;11 others have 
pointed out that continuation procedures enable applicants to update 
pending applications.12  
Thirty-one percent of progenitor applications utilized at least one 
continuation procedure. Continuation procedures fall into two broad 
categories: non-serialized and serialized. 13  Non-serialized 
continuations do not receive a new serial number and are immediately 
docketed to the same examiner that prosecuted the progenitor; the 
progenitor application is then considered abandoned. Requests for 
Continued Examination (RCEs) are by far the most common type of 
non-serialized continuations, and applicants may file an RCE multiple 
times during prosecution.14 At least one RCE was filed by 19.5% of all 
applicants, and 38.7% of applicants that received a non-final rejection 
                                                             
11 See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberley A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 74-76 (2004). 
12 See Deepak Hegde et al., Pioneering Inventors or Thicket‐Builders: Which Firms 
Use Continuations in Patenting?, 55 MGMT. SCIENCE 1214, 1224-25 (2009). 
13 Serialized continuations can be exercised at any point during patent examination. 
Non-serialized continuations may only be used after particular events in 
prosecution, typically after final rejection. 
14 There have been several incarnations of non-serialized continuations, including 
Continued Prosecution Applications (CPAs), Rule 129 continuations (R129s), and 
File Wrapper Continuations (FWCs). The most recent incarnation (and by far the 
most prevalent) is the Request for Continued Examination (RCE). Throughout this 
section, we refer collectively to all of these non-serialized continuations as RCEs. 
Until November 2009, RCEs were put on the “amended docket,” which meant that 
the examiner had to respond within two months. Since that time, RCEs have gone 
on the “special new docket,” meaning that the examiner has more discretion as to 
when to respond (similar to newly docketed applications).   
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filed an RCE. If one includes allowances of non-serialized continuation 
applications, the allowance rate jumps from 55.8% to 69.2%. 
In contrast to non-serialized continuations, serialized 
continuations are treated as new applications. They receive new serial 
numbers and are docketed to examiners based on the classification of 
the new application. There are three types of serialized continuations: 
continuation (CON), continuation-in-part (CIP), and divisional (DIV). 
A simple continuation of a parent application enables applicants to 
receive the benefit of the parent’s priority date, so long as the CON is 
limited to the specification described in the parent application. 
Continuations-in-part allow applicants to introduce new subject 
matter to an existing application. Divisional applications allow 
applicants to separate claimed inventions when two or more distinct 
inventions are claimed in the same application. Serialized 
continuations, with the exception of new matter added in CIPs, receive 
the priority date of the progenitor application if the progenitor is 
pending when the serialized continuation is filed. The progenitor does 
not have to be abandoned, so both applications may proceed through 
the examination process in parallel. As a result, one progenitor 
application can produce a chain of serialized continuations resulting in 
multiple patents, which complicates the calculation of progenitor 
allowance rates. As of June 30, 2013, 15.8% of progenitor applications 
resulted in at least one serialized continuation. Overall, 71.2% of 
progenitor applications resulted in at least one patent after counting 
allowance of continuation applications. 
 Figure 2 plots the three allowance rates by progenitor cohort year. 
The figure shows that the probability of allowance is substantially 
lower for the more recent cohorts of applications. The striking decline 
in both first-action allowance rates and progenitor allowance rates is 
unlikely to be due to censoring, since the mean pendency between 
application date and first-action date was 21.1 months and mean 
pendency between application date and disposal date was 29.1 
months. Although less than 1% of the progenitor applications in our 
study were pending as of June 30, 2013, a larger proportion of 
abandoned progenitors have pending continuation applications, which 
potentially biases our family allowance rates downward for later 
years. We account for this by calculating the maximum possible family 
allowance rate that would occur if all pending applications were to 
eventually issue. Dashed lines in Figure 2 represent maximum 
allowance rates. This correction demonstrates that the average family 
allowance rate for our cohorts could be at most 72.3% (as compared to 
the rate of 71.2% based on disposals observed to date), so the decline 
in allowance rates between 1996-2005 remains quite robust.15  
                                                             
15  The effect of censoring is more pronounced for more recent cohorts and increased 
sharply after 2005, thus validating 2005 as the cut-off year for our study. Figure 
A1 of the Supplementary Appendix presents the lower and upper bounds for each 
of the three allowance rates for 1991 to 2010.  As the window between filing and 
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Figure 2: Trends in Allowance Rates for Applications Filed 
from 1996-2005 and Examined Before Mid-2013 
 
Figure 2 shows trends in the three types of allowance rates for 
applications filed at the USPTO for the first time between 1996 and 
2005 and examined before June 30, 2013. Of the 2.15 million 
applications, 18,270 were pending as of June 30, 2013; the dotted 
lines (for the first-action allowance rate and the progenitor allowance 
rate) represent the corresponding rates if all pending applications 
are, in fact, allowed. These dotted lines represent the highest 
possible allowance rates. For progenitor applications that produced 
pending continuation applications, we assume that every pending 
continuation application will eventually be allowed. The dashed line 
represents the highest possible allowance rate.  
Why did allowance rates decline between 1996 and 2005? Although 
proving causation is difficult, our interviews with patent experts at 
the USPTO suggested at least three plausible explanations for the 
decline. First, the financial market bust in March 2000 and the 
resulting financial constraints may have forced some inventors to 
abandon applications at a higher frequency than during “normal” 
times. Second, the USPTO introduced several procedures in 2000 that 
increased scrutiny of patent applications (for example, the “second 
pair of eyes” system, subjecting certain applications to mandatory 
assessment by more than one examiner before allowing them), which 
may have decreased the probability of patent allowance. Finally, the 
number of pending applications, as well as the lengths of first-action 
                                                                                                                                                       
observation shrinks, the observed allowance rates falls to 0% and the hypothetical 
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and total pendency steadily increased during the period of our study. 
Longer pendency periods have been correlated with more 
abandonment, 16  thus lowering the observed allowance rates. 17  Of 
course, establishing causation or teasing out the relative contributions 
of the above three factors to changes in allowance rates is difficult, 
and future research should separate out the effects of changes in 
USPTO practices from changes in the frequency of abandonment. 
III. ALLOWANCE RATES ACROSS TECHNOLOGY FIELDS 
It is well known that patent value varies across industries. 
Inventors in discrete-product industries, such as the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries, tend to use patents to preclude imitation 
by rivals, while those in complex product industries, such as the 
electronics and computers industries, amass patents to enhance 
bargaining power in cross-licensing negotiations. 18  As a result, 
inventors in different industries appear to pursue different strategies 
during the patent examination process. Additionally, judicial decisions 
affect the standards of patentability for some technological fields, 
while leaving the standards unchanged for others.19 
Figure 3 displays the patent allowance rates for the patent-
technology categories created by Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe and 
Manuel Trajtenberg.20 Applications in Drugs and Medical Instruments 
have the lowest average allowance rate of 42.8%, while applications in 
the Electrical and Electronics sectors enjoy the highest allowance rate 
of 66.6%. Applicants appear to use continuation procedures more in 
sectors with lower allowance rates; for example, 44.1% of the 
progenitor applications in the Drugs and Medical sector used at least 
one of the continuation procedures.21 The decline in allowance rates is 
                                                             
16  See BENJAMIN MITRA-KAHN ET AL., UK INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE & U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT BACKLOGS, INVENTORIES, AND PENDENCY: AN 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 70-90 (2013), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-
uspatlog-201306.pdf.  
17  Table A1 of the Supplementary Appendix presents the correlation between our 
allowance rate measures and the percent change in GDP from the previous year, 
the number of applications pending in the year of filing, and the total pendency for 
applications disposed in the year of filing.  All three allowance rates are strongly 
negatively correlated with pendency and the number of pending applications. They 
are moderately positively correlated with the percent change in GDP. 
18 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox 
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 
1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 107 (2001). 
19 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1207 (2013); 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998).  
20 See generally Hall et al., supra note 9. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg map U.S. 
Patent Classifications (USPC) to six technology categories for issued utility patent 
applications. Id. at 12-13, 41-42. We apply their mapping to all progenitor 
applications in our dataset to treat abandoned and issued applications similarly.  
Continuation applications are assigned to the same technology category as the 
progenitor application. 
21 See Table A3 of the Supplementary Appendix. 
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particularly striking for Drugs and Medical Instrument patents and 
Computers and Communication patents. In these sectors, both first-
action allowance rate and progenitor allowance rates declined by more 
than 50%.22  
 
Figure 3: Allowance Rates by Technology Field (for Patent 
Applications Filed 1996-2005 and Examined Before Mid-2013)
 
Figure 3 shows the three types of allowance rates across the six 
NBER patent-technology fields for applications filed at the USPTO 
for the first time between 1996 and 2005 and examined before mid-
2013.  
IV. ALLOWANCE RATES ACROSS INVENTOR TYPES 
Does the patent allowance rate differ for different applicant types, 
such as small or foreign inventors? To answer this, we identified 
applications as originating from foreign inventors if the primary 
inventor on the application was located abroad, and defined small 
inventors as those that qualified for the USPTO’s small-entity 
discounts on application fees. Large foreign inventors accounted for 
39% of the progenitor applications, large U.S. inventors for 31.1%, 
small foreign inventors for 9.6%, and small U.S. inventors for 20.1%.  
                                                             



























Family allowance rate Progenitor allowance rate First action allowance rate
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Figure 4 reveals that large foreign inventors enjoy the highest 
progenitor and family allowance rates (60.5% and 77% respectively), 
followed by large U.S. inventors (57% and 75.2%). Small U.S. 
inventors have the lowest allowance rates, particularly with respect to 
family allowance rate. Foreign applicants and small inventors are less 
likely to use continuation applications.23 The differences in allowance 
rates across applicant types appear more substantial in some fields 
(such as Computers and Communications) than others.24  The decline 
in first-action allowance rates and progenitor allowance rates appears 
pronounced for U.S. inventors, both large and small.25   
  
Figure 4: Allowance Rates by Inventor Type (for Patent 
Applications Filed from 1996-2005 and Examined Before Mid-
2013) 
 
Figure 4 shows the three types of allowance rates across the four 
inventor types for applications filed at the USPTO for the first time 
between 1996 and 2005 and examined before mid-2013. 
These numbers should be interpreted with caution. Lower 
allowance rates for small U.S. applicants could reflect higher 
propensity for abandonment or differences in the nature of subject 
                                                             
23 Table A4 of the Supplementary Appendix reports the percentage of progenitor 
applications that used the different types of continuations by applicant type. 
24 Table A5 of the Supplementary Appendix reports the allowance rates for the 
different applicant types across technology fields. 
25 Figures A5-A7 of the Supplementary Appendix present trends for the three types 
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matter claimed in the applications. Similarly, large foreign inventors 
may enjoy higher allowance rates because they seek protection in the 
United States for only their most important inventions, or because 
they are more likely to have access to the necessary legal and financial 
resources. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis of U.S. patent applications filed between 1996 and 
2005 and examined through mid-2013 counters the popular belief that 
the USPTO allows nearly all applications to emerge as patents. We 
find that the first-action allowance rate for patent applications is only 
11.4%, and the progenitor allowance rate is similarly low at 55.8%. 
The family allowance rate, which accounts for continuations of 
progenitor applications, is 71.2%. Furthermore, we find that the 
probability that a patent will issue has declined over time, dropping 
from 70% for the 1996 cohort to 40% for the 2005 cohort (even 
accounting for censoring issues as shown in Figure A1). Applications 
in the “Drugs and Medical Instruments” field are least likely to be 
successful, with allowance rates declining sharply during the period of 
our study, while applications in the “Electrical and Electronics” field 
are most likely to be successful. Regardless of technology category, 
however, allowance rates are lower for small inventors.  
What are the policy implications of these findings? Many scholars 
have interpreted allowance rates, typically incorrectly calculated, to 
reflect examination quality alone and have argued that high allowance 
rates indicate low examination quality.26 Our findings challenge the 
popular belief that allowance rates are close to 100%, and based on 
our calculated allowance rates, we find no evidence that the USPTO is 
becoming more lenient in granting patents. To the extent that some 
inventors invest in patent applications based on likelihood of success, 
our findings help correct misperceptions and enable more informed 
decisions about investments. 
Our finding that patent applications filed by small inventors and 
those seeking to protect biomedical technologies were systematically 
less likely to emerge as patents, particularly in more recent years, is 
quite striking. Are small inventors’ applications less likely to emerge 
as patents because they are more likely to file frivolous applications, 
or because they are more constrained in accessing the legal and 
financial resources required to prosecute their applications? Similarly, 
are patents in the biomedical fields less likely to issue because 
applications in these fields increasingly seek protection for less novel 
subject matter? Or are the changes driven by changes in the strategies 
of either patent applicants or examination-related policies at the 
USPTO? Answering these questions will help pinpoint the causes 
behind the substantial variation in patent allowance rates, and is the 
                                                             
26 See, e.g., Quillen & Webster, Continuing Patent Applications, supra note 6; Quillen 
& Webster, One More Time, supra note 6. 
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next step towards developing policy responses to the variation. We 
leave this important investigation for future research.      
Our study also suggests that policy makers should interpret patent 
allowance rates cautiously. Allowance rates are the product of an “opt 
out” system for applicants, driven not only by USPTO examination, 
but also by applicants’ willingness to continue prosecution of their 
applications. Accordingly, allowance rates reflect the influence of 
several variables, including the patentability of the subject matter 
claimed, the rigor of the patent examination process, the length of 
application pendency, and the financial or legal costs of prosecution. 
As such, policymakers should recognize the difficulty of recommending 
changes to the examination system based on observed allowance rates. 
While a lenient patent examination process can impose costs on our 
innovation system, an overly rigorous examination process may deter 
inventors from seeking patents, or worse still, from investing in 
innovation. Achieving the right balance of encouragement and rigor 
will require further empirical analysis of the factors that influence 
fluctuations in allowance rates. 
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Appendix: Supplementary Statistics 
 
Table A1: Correlations Between Allowance Rates and 
Environmental Covariates, 1996-2005 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
(A) First-Action Allowance Rate      
(B)  Progenitor Allowance Rate 0.949 
    
(C)  Family Allowance Rate 0.950 0.998 
   
(D) Percent Change in Real GDP 0.352 0.482 0.515 
  
(E) Total Pending Applications -0.925 -0.994 -0.992 -0.505 
 
(F) Total Pendency  -0.925 -0.967 -0.963 -0.349 0.971 
Table A1 shows contemporaneous correlations between allowance rates and potential 
environmental determinants of allowance rates. All variables are measured annually. 
“Total Pending Applications” refers to the stock of patent applications filed and 
undergoing the examination process for the given year. “Total Pendency” refers to the 
average time, in months, between patent application date and patent disposal date 
during the entry year of the progenitor applications.  
 








Continuation CON CIP DIV Any 
1996 146,260 6.9% 5.6% 6.5% 17.7% 11.2% 24.9% 
1997 166,232 5.8% 5.3% 6.7% 16.5% 12.1% 25.6% 
1998 182,717 6.3% 5.0% 6.8% 16.9% 13.4% 26.9% 
1999 197,704 6.9% 5.0% 6.9% 17.5% 14.5% 28.3% 
2000 222,480 7.1% 4.8% 6.5% 17.2% 15.7% 29.0% 
2001 232,668 7.1% 4.4% 6.5% 16.9% 17.4% 30.3% 
2002 233,246 6.7% 4.4% 6.1% 16.1% 19.7% 31.5% 
2003 235,861 6.3% 4.1% 5.1% 14.6% 24.1% 33.7% 
2004 250,338 6.3% 3.4% 4.9% 13.7% 27.3% 35.6% 
2005 278,160 6.5% 2.7% 4.7% 13.2% 29.2% 37.1% 
Table A2 shows the number of progenitor applications filed per year and the percentage 
of progenitor applications from each cohort that resulted in continuations.  
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Table A3: The Use of Continuation Applications Across 











uation CON CIP DIV Any 
Chemical 245,150 6.0% 5.3% 9.2% 19.1% 18.2% 32.8% 
Drugs & 
Medical 
227,936 12.8% 8.2% 10.0% 28.2% 24.5% 44.1% 
Computers 
& Comm. 
611,046 8.3% 3.2% 3.6% 14.1% 26.7% 36.0% 
Electrical & 
Electronic 
402,401 4.7% 3.0% 7.7% 14.5% 16.4% 27.5% 
Mechanical 311,040 3.9% 3.8% 4.9% 11.9% 13.2% 22.7% 
Others 348,093 4.6% 5.2% 4.2% 13.2% 13.4% 23.7% 
Table A3 shows the number of progenitor applications filed in each NBER patent-
technology field and the percentage of progenitor applications that resulted in 
continuations. 
 
Table A4: The Use of Continuation Applications Across 











uation CON CIP DIV Any 
Large 
Foreign 
838,210 4.4% 1.3% 5.9% 11.2% 21.1% 29.1% 
Small 
Foreign 
207,460 3.7% 3.7% 2.9% 9.7% 12.1% 19.3% 
Large US 668,527 9.2% 5.2% 7.6% 20.4% 23.0% 37.6% 
Small US 431,469 8.2% 9.2% 5.0% 20.5% 14.3% 30.0% 
Table A4 shows the number of progenitor applications filed by applicant type and the 
percentage of progenitor applications that resulted in continuations.  
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Table A5: Allowance Rates Across Applicant Types and 





Applications First Action Progenitor Family 
Chemical 
Large Foreign 112,598 11.0% 59.6% 75.4% 
Large U.S. 76,595 11.3% 57.2% 74.1% 
Small Foreign 20,245 11.6% 52.9% 64.4% 
Small U.S. 35,712 9.7% 52.4% 65.8% 
Computers & 
Comm. 
Large Foreign 244,453 11.7% 54.5% 74.0% 
Large U.S. 251,253 8.9% 51.8% 74.1% 
Small Foreign 32,847 9.6% 37.7% 48.9% 
Small U.S. 82,493 6.4% 34.5% 49.6% 
Drugs & 
Medical 
Large Foreign 62,142 5.3% 45.0% 63.6% 
Large U.S. 69,632 6.0% 43.1% 62.7% 
Small Foreign 27,372 5.7% 39.9% 55.4% 
Small U.S. 68,790 5.6% 41.5% 58.3% 
Electrical & 
Electronics 
Large Foreign 204,125 15.5% 67.7% 83.3% 
Large U.S. 122,529 14.2% 69.3% 84.5% 
Small Foreign 30,489 17.0% 57.7% 65.2% 
Small U.S. 45,258 13.1% 60.0% 71.1% 
Mechanical 
Large Foreign 128,328 15.1% 68.8% 82.1% 
Large U.S. 74,681 14.1% 67.2% 80.5% 
Small Foreign 40,274 15.8% 56.2% 63.7% 
Small U.S. 67,757 12.0% 57.1% 65.9% 
Others 
Large Foreign 86,564 11.3% 60.7% 74.6% 
Large U.S. 73,837 9.9% 56.5% 71.9% 
Small Foreign 56,233 13.5% 51.1% 57.7% 
Small U.S. 131,459 9.5% 49.3% 57.4% 
Table A5 shows the number of progenitor applications filed in each of the six NBER 
patent-technology fields by applicant type and the percentage of each type’s 
applications that produced the different types of continuations.  
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Figure A1: Trends in Allowance Rates with Adjustments for 
Censoring, for Applications Filed Between 1991-2010 
 
Figure A1 shows trends in the three types of allowance rates for the 4.2 million 
applications filed at the USPTO for the first time between 1991-2010. A significant 
number of applications filed after 2005 were pending as of June 30, 2013; the dotted 
lines (for the first-action allowance rate and the progenitor allowance rate) represent 
the corresponding rates if all pending applications are, in fact, allowed. These dotted 
lines represent the highest possible allowance rates. For progenitor applications that 
produced pending continuation applications, we assume that every pending 
continuation application will eventually be allowed. The dashed line therefore 
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Figure A2: Trends in First-Action Allowance Rate by 
Technology Field 
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Figure A6: Trends in Progenitor Allowance Rate by Applicant 
Type 
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